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According to the brain drain argument, there are good reasons for states to limit the 
exit of their skilled workers (more specifically, healthcare workers), because of the 
negative impacts this type of migration has for other members of the community from 
which they migrate. Some theorists criticise this argument as illiberal, while others 
support it and ground a duty to stay of the skilled workers on rather vague concepts 
like patriotic virtue, or the legitimate expectations of their state and co-citizens. In 
this article, on the contrary, we suggest that the liberal conception of states’ legitimate 
political authority demands, and not just permits, that developing states from 
which migration of skilled workers occurs set up contractual mechanisms. These 
mechanisms will ensure that state-funded training in the health sector is provided 
against a commitment on the part of future professionals to reciprocate with their 
services for the benefits obtained. If one of the conditions for the state to maintain 
legitimate political authority is to provide basic services such as healthcare to its 
subjects (while respecting at the same time their autonomy and freedom), then this 
is what developing states affected by the brain drain ought to do. What we call the 
authority-based approach to the brain drain also helps to clarify the obligations that 
other states have not to interfere with these contractual mechanisms when they exist, 
and not to profit from their absence. Inspired by FIFA’s legal instruments of training 
compensation and solidarity mechanism for the transfer of players, we conclude by 
suggesting a plausible global policy to complement this authority-based approach.
Laying the groundwork
Queries on the trans-boundary movement of persons are perhaps the timeliest in the normative 
debate on global justice and international politics. A large part of this debate focuses on the costs 
and benefits migration has for the receiving countries and the individuals who are permitted to 
migrate and settle in those territories. This standard approximation to the problem of migration 
concentrates on the relationship between migrants and the political unit in which they settle.
A different perspective focuses on the costs and benefits that migration has for the political 
community from which persons emigrate. Typical in this debate is the brain drain argument, 
advanced to restrict the liberalisation of migratory policies. According to this argument, there are 
good reasons to limit the right to exit of skilled workers because of the negative impact this type of 
migration would have for other members of the community from which these individuals emigrate. 
Countries that let their skilled workers go are deprived of the talents these citizens could invest 
within the community to improve the life conditions of their fellow citizens. This argument becomes 
1 Acknowledgments: We are grateful to Harry Díaz and Nicolás Lema for explaining to us the intricacies of FIFA’s regulations, as well as to 
two anonymous reviewers for their sharp comments on a previous version of this article. This work was partly supported by the Research 
Council of Norway through its Centres of Excellence funding scheme, project number 179566/V20, and the Millennium Nucleus for the 
Study	of	Stateness	and	Democracy	in	Latin	America	(RS130002),	supported	by	the	Millennium	Scientific	Initiative	of	the	Ministry	of	
Economy, Development, and Tourism of Chile.
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all the most compelling when we focus on essential services such as healthcare, especially in 
developing countries suffering from extreme deprivation of these services. The global distribution 
of human capital related to healthcare is staggeringly unequal and, to a substantive extent, it is the 
outcome of the brain drain phenomenon.
To briefly illustrate this point, Africa and south-east Asia still suffer major shortages of physicians, 
nurses and midwives, with a median density of 2.4 and 6.1 physicians per 10 000 people, and 10.7 
and 9 nurses and midwives per 10 000 people, respectively (compared to the global median of 12.3 
and 17.6). Moreover, foreign-born physicians – many of them, if not most of them, precisely coming 
from these regions – accounted for 22 per cent of active physicians in OECD countries in 2010/11, 
with India providing the largest share (World Health Organisation 2016, 80).2 This shortage of 
medical service – doctors, midwives, nurses – costs millions of lives every year, and many of these 
deaths are the preventable outcome of patterns of skilled workers’ emigration.
In light of these regrettable numbers, Michael Blake and Gillian Brock’s recent book, Debating 
Brain Drain, points to the duties of states in this regard. As it is clear from the subtitle (May 
Governments Restrict Emigration?), Blake and Brock’s specific focus are the duties that developing 
states may have to prevent the brain drain from occurring, and the kind of actions these states may 
permissibly undertake in that regard.
In this article, we take the same starting point as Brock and Blake – i.e. the duties of states 
regarding the brain drain – but we focus on developing sender states (hereinafter, SSs) as much as 
on developed recipient states (hereinafter, RSs). In the last part, we also briefly consider the role 
of other states (hereinafter, non-RSs). In our view, the duties of these three kinds of states have to 
be examined together and in connection with each other, rather than one-sidedly, an approach that 
has so far been lacking in the normative discussion (for a similar critique, see Ypi 2016). To do 
so, we propose an authority-based approach to the brain drain. To keep its political authority (as 
the basis of its legitimacy), the state is bound – among other things – to create policies that satisfy 
the basic needs of its citizens, and that respect at the same time their autonomy and freedom. We 
argue that this approach requires the creation of clear, transparent contractual mechanisms between 
the state and its citizens, so that state-funded training in the healthcare sector is provided against 
commitments on the part of future professionals in this area to reciprocate for the benefits obtained. 
In addition, we show that the authority-based approach helps to clarify the obligations that RSs 
have not to interfere with these contractual mechanisms designed to diminish the brain drain. The 
outcome is a set of policies in SSs and RSs that favour a better distribution of human capital within 
a liberal framework. As a way of conclusion, we suggest a plausible global policy that goes beyond, 
and complements well, the authority-based approach. This policy represents a promising way to 
confront the predicaments created by the migration of skilled workers from developing to developed 
countries. 
Before proceeding, three clarifications are in order. First, we are clear that the brain drain 
occurs in other professions (the massive exit of talented scientists and computer programmers and 
IT-trained people from India to Europe and the US is a good example of this). As suggested above, 
however, in this article we focus on the brain drain of health workers, especially medical doctors, 
nurses, midwives, and pharmacologists; professionals that are greatly needed for the well-being 
and satisfaction of the basic health needs of their communities, and whose loss is consequently 
most problematic from the point of view of justice and other moral obligations. Focusing on them 
makes clearer the moral issues at stake in the question of migration and, simultaneously, makes 
us reflect on the most serious consequences of emigration of skilled workers from disadvantaged 
communities.
Second, like Blake and Brock, we start our enquiry from a liberal framework. This means that we 
are committed to the equal moral value of all persons, no matter where they are, and believe that 
this basic truth has implications for the political institutions and policies that ought to organise our 
communities. This commitment has a direct impact on our views on migration in general, and the 
brain drain in particular, since liberal values guide our recognition of the normative importance of 
2 For additional data and analysis of the brain drain phenomenon in the healthcare profession, see Serour (2009). 
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the right to exit, free movement, and autonomy, all of which are central to deciding questions on 
the trans-boundary movement of persons. Furthermore, our liberal commitments have implications 
for the way we conceive of the state and its functions. While respecting individuals’ basic rights, 
we maintain that the state is to serve its citizens by creating the institutional conditions for the 
satisfaction of their basic needs, and that it may do so by organising collective endeavours that are 
fair and non-discriminatory.
Lastly, our analysis is set at the non-ideal level, that is, it seeks to provide normative guidance 
under current conditions, in the world as it is, divided up into states with borders in between that 
control the otherwise free flow of individuals. The key question that concerns us here is therefore 
how presently existing states may legitimately put a stop to the phenomenon of the brain drain. We 
thus do not deal with the further question whether the long-term solution for this and other related 
problems might be a thorough modification of the global political system leading to, for example, 
the dismissal of states as we currently know them and their replacement by an open-border world, at 
the one extreme, or a retreat to the autocratic state, at the other.
An authority-based approach to the brain drain
Brock and Blake’s book is a welcome contribution to the normative literature on the brain drain. 
It is also the first comprehensive attempt to tackle the question of what states, within a liberal 
framework, may permissibly do to diminish this problem. In our opinion, however, there are two 
main features of their approach that are problematic. First, by overly focusing on SSs, they leave the 
reader with the impression that the responsibilities of RSs regarding the brain drain are secondary 
or indirect, rather than part and parcel of the solution to the phenomenon.3 Second, by putting the 
emphasis on ideas like the fulfilment of legitimate expectations and individual rights, they either 
do not make the strongest and most persuasive case for the imposition of limits on emigration in 
circumstances of brain drain, or fail to recognise the need for such restrictions.
In light of these difficulties, we propose an authority-based approach to the brain drain. This 
perspective underlines the value of political authority and explains the duties both of SSs – to set up 
clear contractual relationships with future health professionals – and of RSs – to either respect the 
existence of these contracts and not to encourage their breach, or not to profit from their absence 
and to encourage their establishment. The combination of these normative demands and policies is 
a promising normative framework to confront the challenges of the brain drain.
More specifically, our approach starts from the premise that the state’s authority (and therefore, 
legitimacy) depends, importantly, on the capacity it has to serve and benefit the individuals who 
inhabit its territory. Put differently, our point is that state political power, which “is always coercive 
power” (Rawls 1993, 133), can legitimately be wielded only if there is a reason for people to subject 
themselves to it. This is not the place to provide a full-fledged account of state authority, but suffice 
it to say that an important reason that individuals have to subject themselves to the coercive power 
of the state is the services and benefits they obtain from its existence.4 In our view, the provision of 
basic services for the satisfaction of human needs or, alternatively, the creation of conditions that 
adequately increase the possibility of the provision of those services, is at the core of the services 
the state ought to provide and, thus, is at the centre of political authority. This is so because any state 
that fails to act in ways that are beneficial for the members of its own political community or, less 
stringently, that does not create conditions for the provision of certain basic benefits and services, 
undermines its own authority. Such a state would not live up to the liberal requirements of legitimate 
authority we have outlined.5
3 We are not claiming that the authors ignore the fact that RSs have duties regarding the brain drain. Brock, on the one hand, recognises 
that, when it comes to issues of global justice (of which the brain drain is an instance), “developed world actors are too much part of the 
problem in undermining states’ abilities to be effective” (Brock and Blake 2015, 29). Blake, on the other hand, does consider different 
policies that the developed world may undertake in order to diminish the negative effects of the brain drain in the communities of SSs 
(Brock and Blake 2015, 219–224). All in all, however, their attention to this part of the problem is very limited.
4	 These	services	and	benefits	are	not	reducible	to	individual	self-interest.	Insofar	as	one’s	understanding	of	the	political	is	subordinated	(at	
least partly) to moral considerations, then we are to conclude that political authority is based on the duties and obligations individuals have 
towards	others.	Thus,	the	state	also	meets	its	functions	when	it	facilitates	the	fulfilment	of	our	moral	obligations	towards	others.
5 Our view therefore assumes that there is already a minimally functioning state in place. Where there is not (as in failed states or quasi-
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This understanding that connects the provision of basic services and benefits to state political 
authority is part of a rather standard account of state legitimacy applied in different areas of political 
theorising. Anna Stilz, for example, uses a similar idea to explain that the territorial rights of the 
state are “not independent of how well it does at representing its people” (Stilz 2011, 579). Quite 
the contrary, states’ territorial rights are grounded on the service that their jurisdictions give in 
the interests of their subjects. Ultimately, this account is inspired by Joseph Raz’s work on state 
authority (Raz 1986). According to Raz, the limit of state legitimacy is marked by the reasons which 
apply to its subjects independently of the directives of the alleged authority. These reasons are moral 
reasons that precede the legal and political commands issued by the state. The state then becomes 
a facilitator of the satisfaction of moral obligations that its citizens have, independently of the 
former’s existence. Among other things, the basic obligation we have to assist those who suffer and 
cannot satisfy their basic needs is something that the state, through its institutions, should facilitate 
for all those under its alleged authority.
For our purposes, this view of political authority and legitimacy means that states should, at 
the very least, implement institutions that favour the provision of basic healthcare services for 
their population. For reasons that will be developed in the following sections, we maintain that a 
contractual strategy between the state and potential trainees in the healthcare sector (whereby the 
latter pledge to complete some sort of service for their community) is a promising mechanism to 
assure the provision of basic healthcare services to the population and, to this extent, maintains or 
deepens the authority of the state.
The idea of implementing clear and well-delimited contracts of this sort between the state and 
future healthcare workers is neither new in the brain drain literature (Brock and Blake, among many 
others, repeatedly mention this mechanism), nor in the actual practice of states (see, for example, 
Frehywot et al. 2010). What is new in our proposal is the view that, insofar as it reinforces the state’s 
political authority, setting these contractual relationships is not just optional, but obligatory for 
states that might otherwise become “brain-drained”.
When considered in relation to the question of brain drain, the authority-based approach has 
strong implications for state policy: it requires not only that the state rules without acting in ways 
that contravene the basic needs of individuals, but also that the state satisfies those needs or creates 
conditions for their satisfaction. On pain of undermining its own authority, the state is therefore 
under an obligation to avoid the effects of skilled workers’ emigration when these effects impede the 
satisfaction of the basic healthcare needs of its citizens. Moreover, this obligation should be satisfied 
in ways that are consistent with the respect owed to persons, so that its policies do not impose 
illegitimate burdens upon particular members of any community. As we shall see, the generation of 
contracts between the state and those who are trained by the state in the healthcare sector satisfies 
these conditions.
At this juncture, it is clarifying to come back to Brock’s and Blake’s views and contrast them 
with the approach just outlined. For them, the crucial question is what justice in emigration requires 
from skilled workers who wish to exit poor, developing countries. Their focus, then, is on the moral 
permissibility of the state’s coercive action to regulate the individual right to exit. By contrast, if 
one starts from an authority-based approach, the crucial question is about the functions that the 
state is to fulfil and the services and benefits it is to provide to its citizens if it wishes to remain 
close to the liberal ideal of legitimate authority. Instead of starting from civic duties, loyalty to 
one’s compatriots, gratitude toward one’s educational institutions, and other imperfect duties of 
individuals, we thus start from the minimal duty of states to serve those who inhabit their territory. 
states), we suggest that the problem of the brain drain poses different demands both for the potential or quasi-political authority and for 
healthcare workers wanting to emigrate – demands that are obviously not grounded on the authority of the state, but on other values such 
as, in the case of the latter, duties of assistance or loyalty toward their immediate community. And what about totalitarian governments? 
Should a citizen of North Korea, for example, be bound by the contracts signed with such a regime if doing so guarantees the provision of 
basic healthcare for her community? Insofar as such regimes do not respect the freedom and autonomy of their citizens (for example, to 
let them exit the country so that they can pursue their medical studies abroad), we do not think that they can qualify as having legitimate 
authority. Contracts made under such conditions should therefore not be morally binding. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing 
us to clarify this point.
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From this basic idea we argue that, to maintain and deepen their own authority, SSs have a strong 
obligation to set clear and well-delimited training contracts with professionals enrolled in careers 
that provide basic health services. Through these contracts, associated to healthcare services greatly 
needed to guarantee the well-being of the community and the fulfilment of their basic welfare 
rights, the state can uphold and deepen its own political authority. The recognition of the value and 
importance of political authority is then the road to confronting the predicament of brain drain.
The authority-based approach and SSs
In this and the next two sections, we expound on the duties that, according to the view just outlined, 
SSs, RSs and non-RSs have to work together against the brain drain. Starting with SSs, we argue 
that the contractual strategy is promising both from a normative and a practical point of view.
Normatively, the contractual strategy is attractive because contracts treat people like autonomous 
agents, and contractual relationships express the respect owed to and between moral agents. A 
genuine contract neither represents the imposition of will upon another, nor counts as an act of 
domination of the mighty over the weak. Contracts express the recognition of the moral status of 
those who participate in it and, thus, are an adequate form of relationship between the state and its 
citizens. Those who object to policies from SSs to retain their human capital often appeal to the idea 
that skilled workers may not be treated as a resource pool, but as sources of moral claims. Indeed, 
it is precisely because we look at skilled workers as sources of moral claims (and duties), rather 
than as mere useful human capital or resources, that we believe a clear contractual relationship 
needs to be established for the requirements made by the state to be morally adequate. That is, 
rather than relying on legitimate expectations, or on the hope that individuals will fulfil a range of 
under-specified patriotic virtues in return for the education that was provided to them by the state, 
we are committed to a form of explicit consent theory for essential services like healthcare.
Second, the contractual strategy is normatively appealing because it legitimises coercive action 
by the SS on the issues covered by the contract. By voluntarily agreeing to the conditions of a 
contract, the signatories commit themselves to abide by these conditions. They also agree to the 
consequences that would follow were one of the signatories not to act according to what the contract 
requires. These consequences may include the revocation of medical licences, repayment of the cost 
of the training to be re-invested in healthcare services, and so on. In a different context, any of these 
consequences might be deemed wrong and condemnable. Yet, when they result from a freely signed 
contract between two agents – here the state and future trainees – these actions become legitimate 
responses to a breach of contract.6
From a practical point of view, contracts are promising because they set up clear and authoritative 
obligations to be followed by the parts involved. Contracts let parties know what they can expect 
from each other, eschewing ungrounded expectations. Similarly, contracts make the individual avoid 
complicated calculations for which she or he may not have adequate information. For example, 
should one reciprocate to one’s fellow citizens for state-provided training during one year, two or 
five? Where in the territory of one’s state should one reciprocate? And so on and so forth. Instead, 
contracts should be designed to provide all the required information for the individual to simply 
abide by them and, thus, contribute effectively to the provision of healthcare of the population.7
Second, contracts are easy to enforce. Even though the details of the consequences that should 
follow a breach of contract would need to be specified thoroughly before the signing of the contract, 
it is clear that when a contract has been signed, the state is entitled to act – and everyone knows it is 
entitled to act – in ways that favour the adequate fulfilment of that contractual agreement.
6 Of course, there are limits to what can be part of a legitimate contract. The form and content of the latter, we suggest, should be negotiated 
and spelled out in a process as deliberative and inclusive as possible, with the participation of the state’s health sector, the training 
institutions and representatives of the future trainees, among other relevant parties. 
7 This practical virtue is explained by Raz’s theory of authority which, as mentioned before, guides our approach. According to it, an 
authority is legitimate if “the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative 
directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to 
follow the reasons which apply to him directly” (Raz 1986, 53).
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Third, that there are already contractual mechanisms of this type in many parts of the world 
confirms their practical advisability. Contracts between the state and individuals that define certain 
obligations held by the latter for benefits received by the former are, for example, used in countries 
like Chile as a standard part of state-funded scholarships to study abroad.8 The principle behind 
these contracts is one of reciprocation, as the state funds the training of its citizens on grounds that 
this training will benefit not only the trainee, but also the trainee’s fellow citizens. Our proposal 
is thus not an ideal to be implemented in a world different from ours, but is already part of the 
mechanisms used by states.
At this point, some could object that letting individuals pursue studies in the healthcare professions 
only if they first agree to sign a contract whereby they will serve a fixed term determined by the 
state is illiberal. Blake seems to suggest this much when he draws an analogy between health 
professionals who sign a contract to stay in their country in exchange for their education, and 
who are therefore not allowed to exit their country, and a real-world case where a couple who was 
held hostage gave their word to their captor that they would not contact the police. After they did, 
the captor unsuccessfully sued them for breach of contract (Brock and Blake 2015, 215–216). In 
drawing this analogy, however, Blake overlooks two crucial differences between the cases.
First, those who decide to pursue a medical career or a nursing career do not do so under duress, 
like the couple in the above example, but willingly: after all, they could well choose to become 
engineers or yoga teachers, and others would be happy to take their place. Moreover, as Brock 
points out, tertiary students in developed countries who agree to take a loan from the state have to 
sign a contract specifying that they will pay the full sum back once they start working – and nobody 
seems to object to that kind of agreement. Here, similarly, students from developing countries who 
want to pursue tertiary education in the health professions may voluntarily do so in exchange for 
certain services specified by the state. It could be counter-argued, however, that paying back in 
money is one thing, but paying back in kind, quite another. This leads to a second reason why we 
think that requiring health professionals to remain for some time in the country that formed them 
does not violate their freedom.
As opposed to the couple in Blake’s example, who had no vocation whatsoever to become 
hostages for an indefinite period, those who enrol in the health professions purportedly do so 
because they have a strong sense of duty toward their fellow human beings. When they make the 
Hippocratic oath, medical doctors pledge to remember “that I remain a member of society, with 
special obligations to all my fellow human beings, those sound of body and mind as well as the 
infirm”.9 The brains drained, then, are those of a certain kind of people who voluntarily choose to 
devote themselves to the service of other people. In addition, it should be remembered that health 
services qualify as essential services, which means that they may involve special obligations – 
moral, but also legal – on those who can provide them.
Finally, there is no such a thing as a right to study medicine with no strings attached. This means 
that the suggestion that the state may be violating the individual’s right by establishing an obligation 
to reciprocate for the training offered is mistaken. Rather than a right to study health professions 
without strings attached, there is an obligation on the part of the state to provide its population with 
certain basic healthcare services. If the satisfaction of this obligation depends on attaching some 
obligations to reciprocate to those who are trained in the healthcare sector, then these obligations are 
perfectly legitimate and represent no violation of individuals’ rights.
Implications of the authority-based approach for RSs
In the authority-based approach, the duty of SSs to generate contractual relations with their own 
people must be complemented with the duty of RSs not to act in ways that encourage the breach 
of those contracts, or that entail benefiting from their absence. This duty results from the idea that 
the state’s obligation to serve and benefit its own people must be constrained, among other things, 
by the limits imposed by the political authority of other states. States are thus under an obligation 
8 See http://www.conicyt.cl/becas-conicyt/sobre-becas-conicyt/que-es-becas-conicyt/.
9 This is part of the modern version of the Hippocratic oath, written in 1964 by Louis Lasagna, Dean of the School of Medicine at Tufts 
University. http://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=20909.
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not to serve their own people through acts that contravene other states’ authority. This is simply an 
articulation of the principle of state sovereignty, foundational of the Westphalian system and well 
cemented in international law, according to which actions that undermine the political independence 
of another state – insofar as the latter is a minimally legitimate state – are wrong and impermissible 
(United Nations 1945, Article 2, para. 4).
Applied to the problem at hand, developed states have an obligation to refrain from hiring health 
workers from developing ones on grounds that such hiring interferes with the latter’s authority. How 
is this the case? When a RS encourages and facilitates the migration of healthcare workers from a 
SS to serve its own citizens, it undermines the capacity of the SS to fulfil its obligation to provide 
basic services and benefits to its own people. As a consequence, the former benefits its own citizens 
through an act that interferes with the SS’s political authority. In other words, by encouraging 
migration of individuals who are essential to the provision of basic services, the RS is directly 
contributing to making the SS unable to satisfy a necessary condition of its own political authority, 
namely to serve its citizens by fulfilling their right to basic healthcare. If, due to the wrongful 
interference of the RS, the SS cannot provide basic services to its own citizens, it loses authority and 
legitimacy in the eyes of its own people and other states.
According to our view, in cases where SSs and their skilled healthcare workers have an ongoing 
contractual relationship, RSs should neither accept the latter without first consulting with SSs, 
nor give them incentives to breach contractual agreements between them and their SSs (or let 
third parties, like recruitment agencies, engage in these practices).10 From these considerations, 
a first general conclusion is in order: the international community ought to favour policies of 
non-interference in the healthcare sector that eschew importing human capital from developing 
countries to provide the benefits and services that are crucial to maintain their own political 
authority.
The sceptic, however, may argue that this non-interference type of argument works only in cases 
where there is already a contract in place between the state and the beneficiaries of state-provided 
training. According to this objection, RSs have a duty not to interfere with existing contracts 
between SSs and some of their citizens. However, in cases where there is no such contract, no wrong 
is committed by RSs if they encourage skilled workers in developing countries to emigrate.
Our answer to this objection is twofold. First, the intervention of a RSs in circumstances where 
there is no contract between a SS and its citizens is wrong not because this intervention results in 
a breach of contract, but because by doing so the former interferes with the SS’s capacity to satisfy 
a basic condition of its own authority, namely, the provision of basic services. In other words, 
by encouraging healthcare workers from the SS to emigrate, the RS uses the lack of requisite 
institutions in SS to its own advantage and, as a direct consequence, makes more difficult the 
establishment of political authority in the latter.
Second, and connected with the previous point, the intervention of RSs in SSs is wrong even in 
the absence of contracts, because such intervention dismisses the value of political authority in SSs. 
If the existence of political authority is a value, as we think it is, then states should favour and boost 
the satisfaction of the conditions of political authority anywhere, and not just in the domestic sphere. 
As we saw above, encouraging skilled workers to migrate from developing to developed countries 
is clearly not a way to do so.
This answer may raise a new rebuttal. It could be objected that this reply forces us to demand from 
RSs some form of assistance – as opposed to strict non-interference – towards SSs, so that RSs are 
to contribute or encourage the celebration of contracts in SSs. This objection invites the following 
clarification: one specific conclusion of our proposal is that instead of assisting other states RSs 
are required to establish in their own territory policies designed to encourage their own citizens to 
train themselves and serve other fellow citizens. The positive impact of such a policy in countries 
10 When it comes to the effects of the brain drain in places like sub-Saharan Africa, some authors have suggested that the systematic and 
widespread recruitment of health workers in these countries ought to be considered as an international crime and an open violation of 
human rights (Mills et al. 2008, 687). This might be too strong a claim to defend. What is not too strong, however, is to say that these 
recruitment agencies are instigating individuals to terminate their contracts before they are due, and are therefore committing a clear civil 
wrong.
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affected by the brain drain would be enormous.11 Ultimately, what this analysis underlines is the 
importance of contractually institutionalising the relationship between the state and students in the 
healthcare professions so as to ensure that the state (be it a SS or RS) remains able to fulfil its duty 
of care toward the community. Such is another welcome conclusion of the authority-based approach 
to the brain drain.
Summing up, RSs should not take advantage of institutional failures or unjust states of affairs that 
may be occurring in SSs. Thus, RSs should not accept skilled workers from SSs without previous 
communication with, and acceptance of, SSs, even if there is no recognisable contract in place. 
Neither should RSs allow third parties, like recruitment agencies, to engage in practices that lead 
individuals to leave their countries of formation shortly after they have obtained their qualifications. 
These principles and practices would have an enormous positive impact on those countries currently 
affected by the brain drain.
Beyond the authority-based approach
The authority-based approach should be seen as a contribution to tackle the problem of brain 
drain, rather than as a solution to it. A comprehensive consideration of the brain drain would have 
to say more, for example, on the global policies required to confront the predicaments resulting 
from skilled workers’ migration. In this concluding section we suggest one such policy that would 
complement well the principles and practices of our approach. This policy is grounded on the idea 
that states have obligations of global justice even if (and after) the obligations specified above have 
been satisfied. In our view, some sorts of distributive principle and practice for the benefit of SSs, 
in general, and for the benefit of the SSs’ healthcare system, in particular, should be put in place 
at a global level, and this should be done by a task force in which SSs, RSs and non-RSs all take 
part. What we envisage is something akin to the training compensation and solidarity mechanisms 
required by the FIFA’s Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (FIFA 2016, 25). The 
rationale behind these payments, as explained by the Court of Arbitration for Sport, is that:
...clubs should be encouraged to train players and those clubs that carry out the training 
process successfully should be rewarded for their efforts. By the same token, those 
other clubs that enjoy the fruits of that process should be obliged to pay something in 
compensation for the training efforts engaged in by others (Manninen 2014).12
This means that, when a soccer player signs his first professional contract with a club that is different 
from the club that trained him, the former must pay to the latter a sum which is calculated roughly 
by taking the costs that would have been incurred by the new club if it had trained the player itself 
(FIFA 2016, 68). Similarly, when it comes to health professionals, one could think of setting up 
a system so that those home institutions that bore the brunt of their formation and training are 
compensated if their trainees decide to go and work abroad.
In our view, this kind of global policy should be considered simultaneously with, not instead of, 
the obligations set out above. The rationale of this additive logic in our proposal is to recognise, on 
the one hand, the normative force of the idea of political authority as a constraint for the practices 
of the state, its citizens, and the international community. On the other hand, it is to recognise the 
limits of our own proposal. An authority-based approach does not solve the brain drain and therefore 
principles and practices that complement it must be explored. This model of compensations does 
precisely that, by complementing the role that developed and developing states have to confront the 
moral predicaments of the brain drain at a global level.
11 Of course, even if RSs comply with these requirements, skilled workers may still emigrate from SSs. Our point, however, is that if RSs 
comply, a big incentive for individuals to leave their SSs fades away.
12 Just to give an example, thanks to the recent transfer of the Chilean goalkeeper, Claudio Bravo, from Barcelona to Manchester City, his 
original club in Chile, Colo-Colo, will receive 1.1 million USD by virtue of FIFA’s solidarity mechanism: http://redgol.cl/2016/8/colo-
colo-recibira-745-millones-de-pesos-p/. It must be noticed that we do not claim this to be a perfect analogy, and reasonable concerns may 
emerge regarding the morally relevant differences between football players and skilled workers. We cannot address this issue here, but we 
believe that the analogy works correctly as a way to point to global policies that could satisfactorily address at least some of the problems 
involved in brain drain.
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To conclude, we do not think that a full solution for the brain drain may be achieved without 
illegitimately infringing upon the basic liberties of the individuals, and to this extent we agree with 
Blake. We do maintain, however, that our proposal at least ensures that those who study professions 
that are much needed for the well-being of the community as well as much sought-after abroad 
will contribute in kind (and maybe also financially) to their SSs. They will do so not primarily to 
display civic virtue, loyalty with their co-citizens, or patriotic gratitude, but because they signed 
an agreement when they freely decided to pursue their careers. If the liberal ideal aims at turning 
politics into as voluntary an affair as it can possibly be, then this should be a welcome move.
In addition, our proposal seeks to make more visible the way in which other states are failing to 
fulfil not only their moral duties of justice in this regard, but also legal duties not to instigate (or 
fail to stop others from instigating) individual parties to breach a contract into which they have 
voluntarily entered. It also seeks to make more visible how developed states fail to satisfy their 
obligations – and thus, act wrongly and impermissibly – when they benefit their own people through 
policies that make it more difficult for other states to achieve political authority and serve their own 
citizens. The recognition of these failures are a step forward towards a more liberal and ultimately 
just state of affairs.
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